In 2015, Zheng et al. proposed an efficient protocol for two-party explicit authenticated key agreement(2EAKA). Zheng et al. claimed that their proposed 2EAKA protocol does not need any fixed public key infrastructure and is provably secure in the random oracle under the Computation Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption. However, this paper points out that Zheng et al.'s 2EAKA protocol still suffers from impersonation attacks based on off-line password guessing attack.
Introduction
Two-party key agreement protocols [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] enable two honest communication parties(for example, users A and B) to communicate over an open insecure network in order to establish a shared common secret session key which can be used later to achieve the cryptographic goals such as condentiality, integrity and authenticity [7] .
The two-party key agreement protocol can be classied into two categories: implicit key authentication and explicit key authentication [1, 2, 7] . A twoparty key agreement protocol provides implicit key authentication if entity A is assured that no other entity besides entity B can learn the value of a particular secret key. Key conrmation means that if entity A is assured that the other entity B is in possession of the secret key. A two-party key agreement protocol provides explicit key authentication if both implicit key authentication and key conformation are provided for all participating entities.
In 2015, Zheng et al. [7] proposed an efficient protocol for two-party explicit authenticated key agreement(2EAKA). Zheng et al. claimed that their proposed 2EAKA protocol does not need any fixed public key infrastructure and is provably secure in the random oracle under the Computation Gap DiffieHellman assumption [8, 9] . However, this paper points out that Zheng et al.'s 2EAKA protocol still suffers from impersonation attacks based on off-line password guessing attack [10, 11, 12, 13] 
Review of Zheng et al.'s 2EAKA Protocol
This section briefly reviews Zheng et al.'s 2EAKA protocol [7] . We outlined some notations used in this research paper.
• ID A , ID B : Identities of user A and user B
• pw AB : Shared password of A and user B
• p, q : Secure large prime numbers such that p = 2 mod 3 and p = 6q − 1
• E(F p ) : Super singular elliptic curve defined by y 2 = x 3 + 1 over F p
• P : Primitive generator for E(F p ) with order q
• G 1 : Cyclic additive subgroup of E(F p ) generated by the base point P
• H(·) : A secure one-way collision-free hash function
• F (·) : A one-way hash function that maps a string to an element of G 1
In the Zheng et al.'s 2EAKA protocol, A and B establish a secure highentropy session key sk from a shared human-memorable password pw AB over a public insecure network under the active adversary. Fig. 1 depicts the Zheng et al.'s 2EAKA protocol, which works as follows: Step 1. A → B: {ID A , η a } User A randomly selects a random element a ∈ Z * p , and computes the followings:
Finally, A sends {ID A , η a } to user B.
Step 2. B → A: {ID B , η b , µ b } Upon receiving the message {ID A , η a }, user B also selects a random element b ∈ Z * p , and then computes the followings:
s =ê(6aP, 6bR) =ê(6P, 6R)
Finally, B sends {ID B , η b , µ b } to user A.
Step 3. A → B: {µ a } Upon receiving the message {ID B , η b , µ b }, A computes the followings:
s =ê(6bP, 6aR) =ê(6P, 6R)
and then checks whether the equality
holds or not. If it does not hold, user A terminates this session. Otherwise, A computes the followings:
Finally, A sends {µ a } to user B.
Step 4. Upon receiving the message {µ a }, user B checks whether the equality
holds or not. If it holds, user B generates the session key
Otherwise, B terminates this session. 
Cryptanalysis of Zheng et al.'s 2EAKA Protocol
This section demonstrates that Zheng et al.'s 2EAKA protocol [7] is vulnerable to impersonation attacks. Here, we show that an adversary Eve could obtain the correct shared password by masquerading as the legitimate user A and doing the following steps:
A1. Eve picks a random element e ∈ Z * p , then computes η e = eP . Finally, Eve sends {ID A , η e } to user B.
A2. Upon receiving the messages {ID A , η e }, user B will select a random element b ∈ Z * p , and then compute the followings:
s =ê(6(eP − pw AB P ), 6bR) =ê(6P, 6R)
Finally, B will send {ID B , η b , µ b } to the adversary Eve. 
(c) Checks if the following equation holds or not
If the check passes, then Eve confirms that the guessed password pw * AB is the correct one.
It is clear that if pw
If it is not correct, Eve chooses another password pw * * AB and repeatedly performs above steps (b) and (c) until
A4. By using the guessed password pw * AB , the attacker Eve can freely perform the user impersonation attack or the server impersonation attack. Therefore, Zheng et al.'s 2EAKA protocol is vulnerable to the above impersonation attacks based on off-line password guessing attack [10, 11, 12, 13] .
Conclusions
This paper reviewed Zheng et al.'s 2EAKA protocol and then pointed out that the 2EAKA protocol is still vulnerable to impersonation attacks based on offline password guessing attack unlike their claims. Consequently, Zheng et al.'s 2EAKA protocol is insecure for practical application. Further works will be focused on improving the 2EAKA protocol which can be able to provide greater security and to be more efficient than the existing password-based explicit authenticated key agreement protocols by an accurate performance analysis.
